The new education policy (NEP) was accepted last year. It has many desirable proposals for the higher education sector. In the next few posts I plan to explore a few different aspects of NEP for higher education (HE) and higher education institutions (HEIs). This one focuses on autonomy for self governance.
Universities are complex organisations trying to respond to the forces of globalisation, technology change, changing expectations from students and public, competition for global rankings and prestige, need for enhanced financial resources, and so forth. In such a scenario, the university must govern itself effectively to face multifaceted challenges of the twenty-first century and provide desired academic outcomes to students and society. For strong professional governance, a higher degree of autonomy is essential, particularly to research universities.
In public universities that are supported through public funds, the state exercises a degree of control over these universities. In many developed countries, it is now broadly agreed that increasing the autonomy of public universities is essential for a modern higher education system. Experience and research indicate that autonomy helps a university in performing better and attract more funds.
The NEP recognises the importance of effective governance and leadership and that a common feature of all world-class institutions globally including India is the existence of strong self-governance and merit-based appointments of institutional leaders. It states that over a period of 15 years, all HEIs in India will become independent self-governing institutions.
For autonomy of governance, the first issue relates to the Board of Governors (BoG), the apex body of an Institution. NEP states that the BoG will consists of a group of highly qualified, competent, and dedicated individuals having proven capabilities and a strong sense of commitment to the institution. It also proposes that the Board will be self-perpetuating, i.e. the BoG itself will find replacements for members whose terms finishes. It proposes that “new members of the Board shall be identified by an expert committee appointed by the Board; and the selection of new members shall be carried out by the BoG itself.” It is implied that the BoG will have none or very few government nominees (the NEP2019 document, which formed the basis for NEP had given a limit for government nominees.)
These recommendations regarding the BoG are indeed along the lines of the best practices being followed globally, and if implemented in letter and spirit, can truly transform the governance of Institutions. First, as the board appoints its members, it will help ensure that each member focuses on welfare of the institution and feels answerable / accountable to it. It also avoids having some government official / nominee in the Board – often such officials are on many boards and their aim is often to ensure that government’s interests are protected, not necessarily to promote the institution’s interests. Selection of members by BoG can also avoid the common situation where some Board positions remain vacant since the concerned ministry is not able to nominate people to the positions for which it has nomination authority. NEP also states that succession should be planned with care so leadership positions are not be kept vacant.
The NEP is silent on how the Chairperson of the BoG will be selected / appointed. (The NEP2019 had suggested that the Chairperson will be selected by the BoG itself from amongst its members.) If the government wants to have a say in this appointment, it is hoped that the selection of the Chairperson will be done through a committee comprising of the Government and the BoG nominees, and that the Board has some say in selection of the Chairperson. And that the Chairperson is appointed sometime before the term of the current Chairperson ends – it is not at all in the interest of the HEI that there be “acting Chairperson”. NEP clearly states that leadership changes should come with sufficient overlaps, and not remain vacant, in order to ensure smooth transitions.
It is also important to ensure that the Chairperson of the BoG has a non-executive role – clearly stated in NEP2019 and is implied in the NEP. In other words, any executive (e.g. the Director or the Vice Chancellor) cannot be the Chairperson of the Board. This is based on sound governance principle, and is globally followed in universities. It will be interesting to see how this is implemented for Universities in India, as many of them follow the old practice which the British established (but which is not followed in UK) where the Vice Chancellor is not only the chief-executive but is also the Chairperson of the Board.
The second important issue of governance autonomy is whether the selection and appointment of the Head of the Institution (Vice Chancellor or Director) rests with BoG or outside the BoG. A person appointed to a post is answerable to the appointing authority. Therefore, if the appointing authority is not the board of the university but some external authority, then, the Head is actually not answerable to the university or the board, but to the external appointing authority. To resolve this fundamental anomaly, the Head of a university, like the CEO of business organisations, should be appointed by the university through its Board and should be answerable to the university.
NEP appreciates the need to have top quality leadership (states that all leadership positions and Heads of institutions will be offered to persons with high academic qualifications and demonstrated administrative and leadership capabilities along with abilities to manage complex situations.) It states that the selection of the Head of the Institution shall be carried out by the BoG through a rigorous, impartial, merit-based, and competency-based process led by an Eminent Expert Committee constituted by the BoG. In other words, the selection and appointment of the Head of the Institution is to be done by the Institution itself through its BoG.
This recommendation, if implemented in spirit as well as the letter, can change the mindset and culture of institution leaders. It makes the Head answerable to the Board, the appointing authority. In today’s scenario, as the appointing authority is outside the institution the appointed leader is really answerable, and perhaps beholden, to the external appointing authority.
When the institution, through its Board, becomes the appointing body, many institutions will find ways to involve the faculty in the selection process. For example, a common method employed in US (and even in some places in India) is to invite the final few shortlisted candidates for leadership to the Institute and meet with faculty and often make a presentation to the Institute body regarding the vision the person has, the values he/she upholds, and what might his/her focus be as a leader. And based on these interactions/presentations, the faculty may give their input/recommendations to the Board, which takes the final decision based on all inputs. This allows all stakeholders of the institute to be involved, and more importantly, the new leader to be answerable to them.
The last issue regarding governance autonomy is of selecting and appointing faculty. Institutional autonomy clearly implies that all appointments made by the institute should be decided and offered by the Institute itself. NEP clearly states that the most important factor in the success of higher education institutions is the quality and engagement of its faculty, and that the current level of faculty motivation is lower than desired. It further states that autonomous institutions empowered to drive excellence, should have clearly defined, independent, and transparent processes and criteria for faculty recruitment, and suggests that promotion, tenure, salary increases, recognition, etc be based on performance.
Autonomy in recruitment, besides requiring that the government officials should have no role in the selection and appointment of faculty, raises a rather touchy issue, particularly for research universities / institutions that aim for excellence and want to be globally competitive and reputed. As their mission includes research and teaching excellence, these institutions should have the freedom to recruit suitable people to these positions based completely on their needs (e.g. in which areas) and excellence-merit/quotient of the candidate, and should have freedom to evolve policies and processes for tenure, promotion, etc based on performance – as supported in the NEP. If the criteria of merit and excellence is diluted for any reason, it is likely to take the institution down a slippery slope where factors other than excellence or performance become significant. This implies, that while the institution should adhere to the academic value of being open to all, it must continue to value talent, and talent alone. Any restrictions (e.g. quotas) on this actually impinge on the autonomy of the institution regarding selecting and appointing the best and most talented faculty to meet its vision and mission.
The NEP has laid out the path for modernisation of governance in HEIs, and has excellent recommendations to bring governance of our institutions in line with the global best practices. It is to be seen how the changes recommended by the NEP are implemented, as some existing rules and practices can come in the way (e.g. of having the Vice Chancellor as the chief-executive and also the Chairperson of the Board.) Implementing the NEP recommendations may also require dismantling of some existing structures (e.g. council for IITs, NITs, IIITs, …) which violate the autonomy of the Institution. The NEP says that there will be some overarching regulation/act which will fix issues. It will be interesting to see how such legacy issues are resolved.
Overall, the NEP has provided for great deal of governance autonomy to Institutions. Though the past record of governments and bureaucracies is that they are loath to give up their power and control – one hopes that the recommendations of the NEP will be sincerely implemented and our HEIs, at least the top ones, will get full governance autonomy as envisaged in the NEP.